The category of open games, which provides a strongly compositional foundation of economic game theory, is intermediate between symmetric monoidal and compact closed. More precisely it has counits with no corresponding units, and a partially defined duality. There exist open games with the same types as unit maps, given by agents with the strategic goal of predicting a future value. Such agents appear in earlier work on selection functions. We explore the algebraic properties of these agents via the symmetric monoidal bicategory whose 2-cells are morphisms between open games, and show how the resulting structure approximates a compact closed category with a family of lax commutative bialgebras.
Open games
In this section we provide a theoretically self-contained definition of open games. However for reasons of space we find it necessary to refer the reader to [5] or [7] for motivation and further details, including the links between open games and classical game theory. 
G
In the string diagram language, a set on the left of a pair always labels a wire pointing forwards, and a set on the right of a pair always labels a wire pointing backwards.
Note that in previous work, open games G : (X, S) → (Y, R) are defined to have a more general best response function
rather than an equilibrium function E G . Any equilibrium game in this sense determines an open game in our sense by letting
While E G records only the Nash equilibria of a game in a context, the function B G records additional information about off-equilibrium best responses, that is to say, how players might correct themselves after playing strategies that are not in equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is precisely a strategy profile which is a best response to itself. The reason for using E G rather than B G in this paper will be made clear in the next section. ε X is called a counit and is denoted X X Crucially, note that there is no natural strategically trivial game (1, 1) → (X, X) that could serve as a corresponding 'unit'. As such, we do not allow a backwards-pointing wire to bend around to point forwards in our diagrams. 
and are studied in detail in [10] . For example, let arg max :
is an open game representing a single decision by an agent who observes an element of X, and then chooses an element of Y in order to maximise a real number. Another example of a selection function is the fixpoint operator fix : (X → X) → P(X) defined by fix(k) = {x | x = k(x)}. The fixpoint selection function is the subject of a worked example in [10] , where it is used to model a 'Keynesian agent' whose strategic aim is to vote with the majority within a voting contest. The open games A fix : (1, 1) → (X, X) are the main subject of this paper.
The operator ⊗ defines a monoidal product with unit I = (1, 1). These sequential and parallel composition operators correspond to sequential and simultaneous play of games. In the string diagram language they correspond respectively to end-to-end juxtaposition with joining matching wires, and disjoint side-by-side juxtaposition. Any string diagram that does not contain a wire bending 'forwards' (in the opposite way to the counit diagram) can be consistently interpreted as an open game, given interpretations of the individual nodes [8] . 
Two different, more general definitions of morphisms between pairs of open games with different types are considered in [6, 9] . However they agree on the globular morphisms of open games, that is those that are identity on the endpoints, which is precisely this definition. (See [13] for a clear definition of symmetric monoidal bicategories.) The bicategory structure allows us to talk about isomorphism and natural isomorphism of open games, where G ∼ = H means that there is an isomorphism Σ(G) ∼ = Σ(H) that respects play, coplay and equilibria (in both directions). There is a 'horizontal' symmetric monoidal 1-category Game h whose morphisms are isomorphism classes of open games. Technically, our string diagrams are valued in this 1-category and denote isomorphism classes.
Definition 9. A covariant object is a pair of the form (X, 1), and a contravariant object is a pair of the form (1, S). We denote the former by X + and the latter S − . Given f : X → Y , we also write f + for (f, 1) and f − for (1, f ).
These respectively define covariant and contravariant monoidal functors from (Set, ×, 1) to (Game h , ⊗, I).
Every object (X, S) of Game is isomorphic to the tensor product X + ⊗ S − of a covariant object and a contravariant object. By lifting the unique (deleting/copying) comonoids (X, ! X , ∆ X ) from the cartesian monoidal category of sets, we obtain a commutative comonoid structure (X + , ! + X , ∆ + X ) on every covariant object, and a commutative monoid structure (X − , ! − X , ∆ − X ) on every contravariant object. We give these the following special syntax in the diagrammatic language:
The fixpoint agent Definition 10. For each set X we define an open game η X = A fix : I → (X, X).
Explicitly, η X is given by the following data:
-The set of strategy profiles is Σ(η X ) = X -The play function is P ηX (x, * ) = x -The coplay function is C ηX (x, * ,
In the string diagram language, we denote η X as follows:
Intuitively, the fixpoint agent forces the values on its two ports to be equal in a Nash equilibrium. However, even if we only care about the behaviour a game in equilibrium, the reason that an equilibrium is an equilibrium ultimately depends on the behaviour of the game off-equilibrium. That is, the players in the game participate in counterfactual reasoning of the form "What if I played a different strategy?" This is the high level explanation of why we cannot obtain a compact closed category of open games with the fixpoint agents as its unit, even after taking a quotient to identify open games of our choosing.
With this notation, the coordination game example from [5] , figure 2 is denoted X This represents two agents, each trying to predict the choice of the other. The set of strategy profiles of this game is X × X, and the equilibria are precisely those of the form (x, x), i.e. the strategy profiles in which the agents successfully coordinate. This game is isomorphic to the open game representation of a standard coordination game with real-valued payoffs, such as Meeting in New York. It is closely related to the Keynesian beauty contest worked example from [10] , in which three agents try to coordinate with the majority.
In a compact closed category, units and counits of a monoidal product X ⊗ Y are built compositionally from the units and counits of X and Y . The counits in Game satisfy this condition, and so do the fixpoint agents:
Proof. Trivial. Proof. Let G be the depicted game. Its set Σ(G) of strategy profiles is naturally isomorphic to X × Y . It is trivial to check that the play and coplay functions agree. Given k : X × Y → X × Y , using the definition of ⊗ we have that (x, y) ∈ E G ( * , k) iff x = π 1 (k(x, y)) and y = π 2 (k(x, y) ). This is equivalent to (x, y) = k(x, y), or (x, y) ∈ E εX×Y ( * , k).
If we use the more general best response formulation of open games, the previous result fails, even laxly. This is the reason that we use the equilibrium set formulation in this paper. (It is a rare example of a result about open games that holds in equilibrium, but can fail off-equilibrium.) 
The coplay function is C ⊲X (x ′ , x, * ) = * -The equilibrium function E ⊲X : X×(X → 1) → P(X) is given by E ⊲X (x, * ) = {x} and ⊳ X is given by the data -The set of strategy profiles is Σ(⊳ X ) = X -The play function is P ⊳X (x, * ) = * -The coplay function is
There are unique functions Σ(⊲ X ) → Σ(id X + ) and Σ(⊳ X ) → Σ(id X − ), namely x → * , however they fail to define morphisms of open games. In particular, for x ′ = x we have P ⊲X (x ′ , x) = x ′ = x = P id (X,1) ( * , x). The same argument applies to any choice of function
Thus we do not obtain a compact closed bicategory [13] , or even a weaker lax or colax variant of one.
The problem remains open of finding a sense in which ⊲ X is related to id X + and ⊳ X is related to id X − . The authors explored the following equivalence relation on the class of open games of a fixed type:
be open games. Given a context (x, k) : X × (Y → R) and strategies σ : Σ(G), τ : Σ(H), we write σ ∼ (x,k) τ if P G (σ, x) = H(τ, x) =: y and C G (σ, x, k(y)) = C H (τ, x, k(y)). We write G ∼ H if for every σ ∈ E G (x, k) there is τ ∈ E H (x, k) with σ ∼ (x,k) τ , and for every τ ∈ E H (x, k) there is σ ∈ E G (x, k) with σ ∼ (x,k) τ .
This relation satisfies ⊲ X ∼ id X + and ⊳ X ∼ id X − , and apparently captures the intuition that these games are 'the same' in the sense that they have the same behaviour in every Nash equilibrium. 
